[VOL. XXXIII relations. Obviously, the Baghdad Railvvay scheme was an imperialistic enterprise, but because territorial aims vvere not much in evidence, it ought to be considered a neo-imperialistic project. During the Sultanate of Abdülhamit II (1876-1909), Germany's refusal to join the other povvers in boycotting the Ottoman Empire because of the Armenian issue, and the memorable offîcial visit of Wilhelm II in 1898 vvas very vvelcome support for the Empire. Later, vvith the coming to povver of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a close affinity vvith the Empire soon became evident, especially because of the great allergy that the other povvers developed tovvards the nationalistic policies of that party. This affinity certainly must have played a part in the decision of the CUP government to throvv in its lot vvith the German-Austro-Hungarian alliance in 1914. That alliance continued until the very end of World War I. Whether the memory of GermanOttoman alliance played any part in Hitler's mind in his disinclination to attack Turkey during WW-II is, as far as I knovv, a matter of conjecture.
Despite the German-Ottoman alliance in WW-I, in the ıntervvar period Turkey and Germany vvere, in a sense, in opposite camps. Turkey, thanks to its national struggle, vvas able to avoid the partition and emasculation that had been ordained at Sevres. The peace treaty of Lausanne (1923) that replaced it, had, to a large extent, satisfied Turkey's demands. As a result, she vvas in the "Pro-status quo" camp. Germany, hovvever, had had to accept the Versailles Treaty, vvhich had reduced her territory, deprived her of her colonies, burdened her vvith a huge indemnity and other restrictions. Therefore, she vvas in the revisionist camp. Nevertheless, Germany in the 1930's made it a matter of policy to buy most of Turkey's exports at good prices. The result vvas that most of Turkey's imports came from Germany. This exchange vvas effected through clearing agreements. The Turkish government vvas uncomfortable about the dominance of Germany in her foreign trade and vvas seeking to diversify her trade partners. It is interesting to note that in spite of this German dominance, Turkey vvas able to vvelcome and employ 142 German academics vvho had been purged by the Nazi regime. In other vvords, the Turkish government's freedom of action seems not to have been greatly affected by the said relationship. Everything seemed to be going vvell vvhen the vvhole vvorld vvas thunderstruck by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) . Negotiations betvveen France and Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet government on the other, had been progressing vvhen it seems that Stalin suddenly concluded that the Western povvers vvere vvlaying a game, that they did not intend to build an alliance vvith the Soviets, and that their real aim vvas to bring about a German-Soviet vvar. Thereupon, the Soviets made a deal vvith the Germans in order to stave off their fırst onslaught and thus gain time. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put Turkey in a predicament, because the Soviet Union thus had suddenly joined the revisionist camp. indeed, Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscovv on September 25, 1939 vvas a failure. The Soviets vvere demandmg the "joint defense" of the Dardanelles, and a revision of the Montreux regime (1936 would come to the aid of its allies. No provision of the Treaty vvould be construed to force Turkey into an armed conflict vvith the Soviet Union. Thus, so long as the Soviet-German Pact stood, Turkey maintained its neutrality. Because Bulgaria vvas a German ally and because Greece vvas invaded by Germany, Turkey became Germany's neighbour. When Germany asked for a non-aggression pact, Turkey concurred and on June 18, 1941, this pact vvas signed. This vvas four days before Germany's declaration of vvar on the Soviet Union.
Novv, vvith Germany and the Soviets on opposite sides, pressure began to be exerted on Turkey to enter the vvar. Turkey, hovvever, made it a point not to comply. The story of Turkey's steadfast neutrality is abtly portrayed in Selim Deringil's study.
1 A lot has been said about Turkey's default in respect to its Tripartite Treaty, especially from the Soviet side. They, vvith an active agitation based on this legal point, tried to push through territorial claims and attempted to establish hegemony över Turkey by conrolling the Straits. The legal aspects have been and vvill be argued at length. I vvill not go into that.
What I do vvant to underline are the motives for Turkey's neutrality. The first motive vvas Turkey's unpreparedness for mechanized vvarfare. When the Republic vvas founded in 1923, Turkey vvas in every respect a very poor country, burdened vvith a sizable share of the Ottoman Debt. Över the years, Turkey, vvith no exterior aid and a minimal amount of debt, tried to build a material and educational-cultural infrastructure, vvhile at the same time nationalizing foreign investments and paying the Ottoman Debt. It is hardly surprising that very liftle vvas left for military investment. In 1943, at the Adana (January 30-31) and Cairo (December 4-7) Conferences, President İnönü put forth this excuse to counter Churchill's and Roosevelt's demands for Turkey's entry into vvar. The Allies thereupon provided some military hardvvare, but this vvas hardly suflfıcient and necessitated a length of time for the training of personnel.
The second motive may have been the unsavory prospect of Allied troops coming to Turkey to support its vvar effort. This might have entailed a certain amount of intervention in Turkey's internal affairs. If we consider that Soviet troops might also have been among them, Turkey's repugnance becomes easier to understand, as the Soviets had evinced territorial claims regarding Turkey. It is to be remembered that the Germans, even in their retreat, seemed to lack neither the means nor the determination to fıght.
As the final German defeat became imminent, Turkey made certain moves in support of the Allies. June 6, 1944 was the date of the Normandy landing. On May 26, Turkey had decided to end strategic chrome exports to Germany. On June 15, 1944, Numan Menemencioğlu, the Foreign Minister who vvas knovvn for his proGerman sympathies, resigned.
2 Again in June, German merchant ships passing through the Straits, vvhich probably often carried military material or personel, began to be searched.
3 On August 2, 1944, diplomatic relations vvith Germany vvere ended. No doubt the active encouragement of the Allies played a certain part in these moves.
At the beginning of February 1945, the Big Three, represented by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, met in Yalta. It vvas decided that to be considered an Associate Nation in planned United Nations, organization, and thus to be able to participate in the San Fransisco Conference, should be conditional on a declaration of war on Germany and Japan before March 1945. On February 20, Peterson, the British Ambassador in Ankara, communicated this decision to the Turkish Government.
On February 23, 1945 the Turkish Grand National Assembly decided by a unanimous vote of 401 members to declare vvar on Germany and Japan (54 members vvere absent). 4 During the debate, Foreign Minister Hasan Saka said that the British Ambassador's advice ("telkin") had been thoroughly examined by the government and that it had been decided to accept it as being in keeping both vvith the alliance and vvith the "high interests" of the state which had ali along inspired the government's policy. Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, on his part, declared that the Turkish Republic had from the very first minutes of danger plaeed its vvord, arms and heart on the side of "democratic nations" and had ali along pursued that policy. Now, one more step vvas being taken to officially join the ranks of the Allies where Turkey had already been in practice. MP Mümtaz Ökmen pointed out that ali of the neighbours of the Soviet Union ("this great friend") except Turkey had joined the opposite side or given right of way to the armies invading that country. The Soviets' heroic stand at Stalingrad had been facilitated by the fact that the Straits and the Caucasian ffontier vvere in friendly hands. Had it not been for Turkey, the result at El-Alamein might also have been dubious. He also asserted Turkey's basic policy as being Turkish-Soviet friendship.
Ökmen's point about Turkey's military contribution to the Allied cause vvas also taken up by Independent Group 5 leader Alı Nihat Tarlan and Şemsettin Günaltay. Rasih Kaplan vvent even further, asserting that by keeping her armies ready for vvar, Turkey could be considered to have been at vvar.
In the nevvspaper Akşam, Necmettin Sadak (February 24) pointed out that the proposition to declare vvar on Germany had not been made to the main neutral countries, and that therefore, it vvas a kind of privilege. Nadir in Cumhuriyet, the same day, said that they vvere sincerely together vvith the freedom-loving nations. Retired General H. Emir Erkilet, who vvrote a column in the same paper and vvho had displayed pro-German sympathies during the vvar (at one point, he had visited the German front in Russia) vvas novv vvriting about "Soviet Russia's Military Might". In the unsigned column, titled "Political Report" (İcmal), it vvas asserted that the Turkish nation vvould have nothing to do vvith a Germany, vvhich claimed racial superiority and lebensraum and thereby refıısed other nations' rights, invaded their territory and turned the vvorld into a prison. The same vvas true of Japan, vvhich, claiming to establish an area of prosperity, enslaved nations and strangled the ideals of freedom and independence. The Turkish nation vvas democratic and stood by the democratic front. According to the report of the Anatolian News Agency, The Times, on February 25, vvelcomed in its leading article Turkey's decision, This, in short outline, is the story of Turkey's declaration of war on Germany.
